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In terms of geography,  Hungary, or, in a wider sense, the  Carpathian Basin, 
is held to lie in the heart of  Europe, insofar as  Europe is conceived in the 
traditional way as stretching from the  Atlantic Ocean to the  Ural mountains. 
Yet it is also commonly said that the territory of  Hungary straddles the 
“highway of peoples”, as the westernmost plain of the great Eastern  Steppe, 
for it was through this area that the peoples passed on their way from East 
to West in the Middle Ages, some of them settling here only to disappear 
in the ruins of history (such as the Sarmatians, the Gepids, the  Huns, the 
Avars and others).  Magyars ( Hungarians) are likewise a people of eastern 
origins, which, according to the most recent scholarly view, was formed 
sometime during the ﬁ rst half of the ﬁ rst millennium B. C., and thus can 
look back on some three thousand years of history. This ethnic group 
changed its way of life at least twice thereafter, undergoing a transformation 
ﬁ rst from a society of hunters and ﬁ shers into nomadic horsemen and then 
gradually turning from nomads into settled farmers. Their settlement area 
also changed frequently. Beginning with an original homeland beyond the 
 Ural mountains, they spent a long time in the steppe area of present day 
Russia and the  Ukraine before crossing the  Carpathian mountains to settle 
in their present homeland at the end of the ninth century.1 Their culture 
was accordingly exposed to multiple external inﬂ uences, and as a result the 
people itself was profoundly transformed (in terms of material culture, music 
and religious beliefs) from  Finno-Ugrian to  Turkic nomad. (The memory 
of this change lives on in the most commonly used foreign name of the 
 Magyars:  Onogur being the root of term – more widespread in international 
usage than Magyar – Hungarian, Ungarn, vengerskij, Hongrois, etc.) As 
nomadic  Turks they took hold of their ultimate homeland, where, as we 
shall shortly see, they were quickly converted into full-ﬂ edged Europeans. 
Yet despite these shifts and changes,  Hungarians, as we shall now call them, 
have demonstrated an almost unparalleled continuity in terms of the basic 
1 Türk, A.: A korai magyar történet kutatásának új régészeti programja [= The new 
archaeological program of scholarship on early Hungarian history]. Magyar Régészet Online 
Magazin 2012 summer, 1–6.
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characteristics that deﬁ ne a people. Over the course of some three millennia 
they have been able to preserve their common set of symbols (basically their 
language) and an ability to diff erentiate/separate themselves from other 
ethnic groups, an ability that has found manifestation in their own enduring 
self-denomination.2 Peoples that came into contact with the  Hungarians 
called them variously Bashkir,  Onogur/Ungri, Turk, Madžar, or Schytian, 
etc., but in their own eyes the  Hungarians always remained a separate people, 
whose name was ﬁ rst Magyer and then Magyar. This was achieved by only a 
handful of the many ancient peoples of the steppe, perhaps most noticeably 
by the  Oguz-Turks, the founders of modern  Turkey and its predecessor, the 
 Ottoman Empire.
Although the  Hungarians, who invaded and then settled the  Carpathian 
Basin, occupied the geographical middle of  Europe and have since been part 
of Western or  European civilisation, over the course of the last millennium 
they have mostly been relegated to the margins of that civilisation. And they 
have generally been entirely aware of this. Before speaking about this frontier 
situation and experience, which profoundly inﬂ uenced both the history of 
 Hungary and the mentality of its inhabitants, it is worth pausing to off er a few 
words regarding what I mean by the West or  Europe, and why I maintain that 
this eastern people has essentially been transformed into a  European one. In 
order to answer this question, I invoke Rémy Brague, a  French philosopher 
who in my view has off ered one of the best interpretations of “ Europe”.3 In 
his opinion, the uniqueness of  European civilisation lies in its  Roman roots, 
the Latinity that grew from these roots, and Latin Christianity. This model 
is based on the concept of repeated new starts, the constant rediscovery and 
reinterpretation of ancient cultural heritage, and the transfer of tradition 
between the past and the continuously changing present. Consequently, the 
history of  Europe can be regarded as a series of renaissances over the course 
of which the West has expanded incessantly, both in a territorial and an 
intellectual sense, acquiring during this process an unparalleled capacity for 
self-reﬂ ection. This capacity for self-reﬂ ection in turn gave rise to a tendency 
towards constant spiritual and technical renewal, the creation of dynamic 
structures, and, most importantly, the separation of the spiritual from the 
temporal (in the long run, of the church from the state), which is its most 
2 Róna-Tas, A.: A honfoglaló magyar nép. Bevezetés a korai magyar történelem ismeretébe 
[= The conquering Hungarian people. Introduction to early Hungarian history]. Budapest 
1996, 20ff ; Fodor, I.: Az ősmagyarság etnikai tudata és a Csodaszarvas-monda [= The 
ethnic knowledge of early Hungarians and the legend of the miracle stag]. In Csodaszarvas. 
Őstörténet, vallás és néphagyomány. II. Ed. Á. Molnár. Budapest 2006, 9–39. 
3 Brague, R.: Europe, la voie romaine. Paris 1993 (I used the Hungarian translation: 
Brague, R.: Európa. A római modell. Elsajátított önazonosság. Piliscsaba 1994).
Maroth.indb   400 2013.09.13.   17:14:28
HUNGARY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: THE OTTOMAN TURKISH LEGACY 401
distinctive feature. It was to this Latin Europe, the so-called Respublica 
Christiana, that the  Hungarians, having settled in the geographical middle 
of  Europe, attached themselves after some hesitation (that is, a brief initial 
orientation towards  Byzantium), soon becoming acknowledged members of 
this civilisation. Thereafter,  Hungary partook of the continuous “renaissance” 
that is so characteristic of the West/ Europe. Even if with some delay and less 
intensity and prevalence, all forms of Western cultural evolution appeared in 
 Hungary and inﬂ uenced its culture, including the Romanesque and Gothic 
styles, humanism and the Renaissance, mannerism and baroque, classicism, 
rococo, romanticism, and avant-garde.
Although the  Hungarians and the peoples living together with them 
imported  European civilisation into the  Carpathian Basin fairly quickly, as 
noted above in reality the country has remained on the fringes of  Europe 
ever since. This is true in two senses. First, it was here that  Europe ended 
culturally: to the east and south lay the territory of  Byzantine civilisation (or 
commonwealth), where the relationship between state and society, church 
and state was entirely diff erent.4 Second, the  Carpathians also constituted the 
political and military frontier of the Occidens.5 From beyond the  Carpathians 
and the border rivers new waves of eastern peoples continued to assault the 
Kingdom of  Hungary, which, as one of the strongest states of contemporary 
Europe , won considerable respect through the wars of defence against them. 
The Hungarian kings assumed titles such as “defender of Christianity”, 
“champion of Christ”, or “warrior of the Christian faith”, and their kingdom 
was regarded throughout Europe as its eastern “gate” (porta). The 
Hungarian Kingdom not only blocked the attacks launched from the East 
(for instance, the  Mongol invasion or the raids of the Golden Horde), but, 
with the support of the papacy, it also led a series of “missionary” campaigns 
against the neighbouring countries and regions, the Patarens/Bogomils and 
Eastern Christians, who were regarded as “heretics”, “schismatics” or simply 
4 Obolensky, D.: The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500–1453. Crestwood–
New York 1982. Here I will not enlarge upon the on-going debates on the regional place 
of Hungary and the concept of “Central Europe”. I only mention that I fundamentally 
follow the “three Europe” model of J. Szűcs (Les Trois Europes. Préface de F. Braudel. 
Paris 1985), even if the notion of “Central Europe” as understood by him and other 
authors (cf. Horel, C.: Cette Europe que’on dit centrale. Des Habsbourg à l’integration 
européenne 1815–2004. Paris 2009) as a historical reality with a long history has attracted 
serious criticism. See, for instance, Todorova, M.: Imagining the Balkans. Updated 
Edition. Oxford 2009, esp. 140–60.
5 Berend, N.: At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and ‘Pagans’ in Medieval Hungary 
c. 1000 – c. 1300. Cambridge 2001, 6–41.
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“rebels”. It was during one of these campaigns that the king of  Hungary ﬁ rst 
encountered  Ottoman troops (in 1375).6
Yet it was not only military activities that continued to attach the 
“westernised”  Hungarians to the East.  Hungary in the  Árpád age (900–
1301) continuously welcomed settlers belonging to various Eastern peoples 
in great numbers: Muslim Ismaelites, later also called böszörmény and káliz, 
who played an important role in the ﬁ nancial administration of the country, 
and also  Pechenegs,  Jews,  Cumans and  Yazigs (Alans).7 The  Hungarians 
also remembered that part of this Hungarian people had not come to the 
new homeland, but had remained somewhere in the East, and on the eve of 
the  Mongol invasion they were indeed sought out and visited by the king’s 
envoys. The story of the miracle stag, which is considered the legend of 
the origins of the  Hungarians, has also preserved the memory of the role 
played by several eastern peoples ( Onogur  Turkic,  Bulgarian,  Alan) in the 
Hungarian ethnogenesis. Whether the  Hungarians (especially one of their 
branches, the Székelys) or the ruling dynasty of the Árpáds were related or 
otherwise connected to the  Huns and their great king  Atilla, or, alternatively, 
whether they ever cherished such a tradition is a matter of constant and 
heated debate even today. Although most scholars regard the relationship 
as a late, thirteenth-century intellectual construction, the alternative view, 
according to which the medieval  Hungarians were attached by an unbroken 
conceptual relationship to this people (which had a terrible reputation in the 
West) has recently won increasing support.8 The  Székely script, for example, 
a type of the Western  Turkic runic scripts, was apparently preserved during 
the Middle Ages in the eastern part of the country.9 What remains a fact is 
that most  Hungarians had continued to believe ﬁ rmly until as late as the 
end of the nineteenth century that they were indeed the descendants of the 
 Huns and  Atilla.  Hungary was thus successfully and completely integrated 
into Latin Europe , while, so to say, culturally the country always kept an 
6 Fodor, P.: The View of the Turk in Hungary: the Apocalyptic Tradition and the Red 
Apple in Ottoman–Hungarian Context. In Les traditions apocalyptiques au tournant de 
la chute de Constantinople. Actes de la Table Ronde d’Istanbul (13–14 avril 1996). Éds. 
B. Lellouche – S. Yerasimos. Varia Turcica XXXIII. Paris–Montréal 1999, 99.
7 Györffy, Gy.: A magyarság keleti elemei [= Eastern elements of the Hungarian people]. 
Budapest 1990; Székely, Gy.: Les contacts entre Hongrois et Musulmans aux IXe–XIIe 
siècles. In The Muslim East. Studies in Honour of Julius Germanus. Ed. Gy. Káldy-Nagy. 
Budapest 1974, 53–74; Berend (n. 5).
8 Szabados, Gy.: Attila-ős, a sólyomforma madár és a fehér elefánt [= Ancestor Attila, the 
falcon-shaped bird, and the white elephant]. In Világügyelő. Tanulmányok Hoppál Mihály 
70. születésnapjára. Eds. J. Czövek – V. Dyekiss – Zs. Szilágyi. Budapest 2012, 416–25.
9 Benkő, E.: A középkori Székelyföld I. [= The Székely Land in the Middle Ages]. Budapest 
2012, 48–59. 
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eye on the East and refused to let this component of its identity fall into 
oblivion. Yet in all decisive situations and at all major turning points, the 
leaders of the  Hungarians opted for the West, whatever the costs. This is 
what happened at the time of the  Mongol invasion, when, by engaging the 
invader in defence of the country and the West,  Hungary suff ered a terrible 
demographic catastrophe. The  Mongol invasion was a real turning point in 
the sense that it left an indelible mark on the mindset of the  Hungarians, 
which, moreover, was later strengthened by new impulses. It was then that 
the belief according to which this great eastern invasion was a scourge visited 
by  God upon the country and the Christian world in general on account of 
the sins of mankind (a belief that had a long tradition in Europe ) ﬁ rst spread 
among the  Hungarians. It provided a conceptual frame of reference within 
which the  Ottoman Turkish raids, which began 150 years later, could be 
interpreted.10
Over the course of the fourteenth and ﬁ fteenth centuries the Latin West 
came to face again a major Muslim attack, the second after the great  Arab 
invasion. This time, it appeared in the form of the  Ottoman Empire. This 
great power was formed in the early fourteenth century and seems from 
the outset to have set three aims for itself to achieve simultaneously: 1. to 
restore, as completely as possible, the Islamic commonwealth under its own 
leadership; 2. to defeat and incorporate the  Byzantine commonwealth; 3. to 
re-establish the universal  Roman Empire by besieging the Latin world.11 After 
 Byzantium and the core area of orthodox civilisation had fallen by 1453 and 
some of the frontier states ( Venice in the  Mediterranean and  Poland in the 
north-eastern front) had chosen the path of cooperation instead of conﬂ ict, 
by the early sixteenth century the burden of halting  Ottoman expansion was 
borne primarily by  Hungary and her  Austrian– German– Czech– Moravian 
hinterland and also by the  Spanish empire of  Charles V.  Hungary was hit by 
the ﬁ rst  Ottoman attack in 1390, after which the country was never entirely 
free of war until as late as the treaty of  Passarowitz in 1718. This obviously 
had very serious consequences that decisively inﬂ uenced the fate of the 
country. But, before speaking about this and the relationship between the 
 Hungarians and the conquerors, it is worth taking a moment to examine 
brieﬂ y the  European dimensions of this new encounter of West and East.
Over the course of the past thirty–forty years, historians have made 
it clear that the traditional view of  Ottoman expansion, which discerned 
nothing but sharp conﬂ ict between Europe and the  Ottomans and spoke of 
10 Fodor (n. 6) 104–105.
11 See Fodor, P.: The Ottoman Empire, Byzantium and Western Christianity. The 
Implications of the Siege of Belgrade, 1456. AOrientHung 61/1–2 (2008) 47.
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a struggle between two worlds equally determined in terms of ideology and 
religion, is no longer tenable.12 Indeed, the formative role of the  Ottomans 
in the birth of modern Europe is increasingly emphasized. The renowned 
specialist of  Spanish history, John Elliott, opined for instance that the 
 Ottoman menace had a twofold eff ect on the West. On the one hand, it 
prompted unity, since smaller states were compelled to seek the help of their 
larger neighbours. The leaders of the Habsburg Empire did not hesitate 
to proﬁ t from the opportunity in order to increase their authority. On the 
other hand, in return for the support that they needed in order to wage war 
against the  Ottomans, both the emperor and the kings were obliged to make 
concessions to local forces and divergent confessions, which made possible, 
for instance, the survival of Protestantism. Thus “ European history may 
be regarded as the history of a continuing dialectic between the aspiration 
toward unity and the pressure for diversity. The empire of  Süleyman inserted 
itself into this dialectic at a critical moment in  European development. The 
threat posed by Islam gave a powerful impetus to the yearnings for Christian 
unity … But, the stronger the pressure for unity, the greater the resistance … 
The  European world that emerged from the sixteenth-century confrontation 
with Islam was a world set on the path of political, religious and cultural 
pluralism.”13 In other words, the pluralist structure (based on confessional 
communities and nation states) that gradually emerged in Europe in these 
centuries would probably have been impossible without the  Ottomans. And 
this is not all. For, in a sense, by the turn of the ﬁ fteenth and sixteenth centuries 
the  Ottomans themselves, although still stigmatized as the “arch-enemies of 
Christianity”, had become part of the emerging modern  European political 
system. Just as the  Ottomans became interested in breaking Christian unity, 
so some  European states began to use the  Ottoman alliance as a means of 
maintaining the  European balance of power. The  Ottoman card was used ﬁ rst 
and foremost by  France, but cooperation was proﬁ table for the  Ottomans as 
well. Of equal importance with regard to the birth of modern Europe  was 
the economic cooperation that developed between the  European trading 
nations and the  Ottomans in the  Levantine commerce. The trade that was 
carried out by the  Genoese and the  Venetians, and later the  French, the 
 English and the  Dutch in the Near East provided a source of accumulation 
12 Goffman, D.: The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge 2002; İnalcik, 
H.: Mutual Political and Cultural Inﬂ uences between Europe and the Ottomans. In 
Ottoman Civilization 2. Eds. H. İnalcik – G. Renda. Ankara 20042, 1048–1089; The 
Ottomans and Europe. Travel, Encounter and Interaction from the Early Classical Period 
until the End of the 18th Century. Ed. S. Kenan. İstanbul 2010.
13 Elliott, J.: Ottoman–Habsburg Rivalry: The European Perspective. In Süleyman the 
Second and His Time. Eds. H. İnalcik – C. Kafadar. İstanbul 1993, 161–62.
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of wealth for the emerging  European capitalist system the importance of 
which cannot be overemphasised. Closely related to this was the fact that 
 Istanbul, the capital city of the  Ottoman Empire, became one of the centres 
of early modern diplomacy where gradually all the major  European states 
established standing embassies and where they fought not so much against 
the  Ottomans as against one another for the resources available in  Ottoman 
territories. It is worth remarking that, whereas according to the traditional 
view modern diplomacy (that is, standing embassies, etc.) was born in 
ﬁ fteenth-century Italy, according to a more recent opinion it evolved from 
the so-called capitulation system of the  Ottomans, the basic structures of 
which can already be discerned in the fourteenth century.14
Yet the  European integration of the  Ottomans clearly had its limits. 
Although in the eyes of a minority (primarily  French intellectuals such as 
Guillaume  Postel, Jean  Bodin and others) the  Ottomans were highly praised, 
especially on account of their presumed religious tolerance, the great majority 
of Europeans ﬁ rmly refused both intellectually and emotionally to accept the 
 Turks as equals. Even the great Hugo  Grotius, the father of natural law, was 
of the opinion that the ﬁ ght against the  Ottomans was the common cause 
of Europe.  And it is exactly here that another important contribution of 
the  Ottomans to modern Europe  can be identiﬁ ed: eventually, the presence 
in Europe of this power and its long-feared military force helped maintain 
the idea of  European unity and bring forth the concept of federalism. The 
majority of  European thinkers – from pope  Pius II (who in the ﬁ fteenth 
century referred to Europe  for the ﬁ rst time as a “common hearth and 
homeland”) to those who dreamt up the great plans of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries – imagined that  European unity could be based on an 
alliance formed in order to ensure the expulsion of the  Ottomans and the 
resulting victorious war. From the seventeenth century on this was closely 
connected to the idea of a worldwide Christian mission in preparation for 
colonisation, which already served both the realisation and the justiﬁ cation of 
 European dominance.15 Consequently, the  Ottomans were denied admission 
into the family of  European peoples until as late as 1856, the Treaty of 
 Paris, which ended the  Crimean War. It is true, however, that the  Ottomans 
themselves had laid no serious claim to such admission before the nineteenth 
14 Goffman, D.: Negotiating with the Renaissance State: the Ottoman Empire and the New 
Diplomacy. In The Early Modern Ottomans. Remapping the Empire. Eds. V. H. Aksan – D. 
Goffman. Cambridge 2007, 61–74.
15 Bóka, É.: Európa és az Oszmán Birodalom. Az európai egységgondolat politikai 
eszmetörténetének kezdetei [= Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The beginnings of the 
political history of the notion of European unity]. Budapest 2004.
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century, for they had been unwilling to give up an international policy based 
on jihad, that is, conquest, before they were fatally weakened. On the other 
hand, the presence and relations of the  Ottomans in Europe  encouraged 
Western debates on emerging absolutism. Its protagonists, such as  Bodin, 
looked on the sultan’s authority as a kind of model to follow, whereas others 
used the presumed despotism of the Ottoman state as an intellectual weapon 
to be wielded against the notion of absolute royal power. Either way, the 
 Ottomans loomed large in the  European mind throughout the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, and the  European attitude towards them was as 
ambiguous then as it is today (in other words the question still remains, “to 
grant them admission or not to grant them admission”).
Naturally, the Ottoman problem concerned the  Hungarians most 
directly, for they stood on the frontline and this time proved unable to halt 
the East at their own borders. The “East” is used here not in a metaphorical 
sense: we know from the writings of an Ottoman literate who took part 
in the decisive battle at  Mohács (1526) that the Ottoman ruler had set 
out against  Hungary as the representative of the East, the rising Sun, who 
wanted to bring the West to its knees.16 An Ottoman- Turkish scholar had 
already interpreted the Ottoman  campaign that had ended with the capture 
of  Belgrade ﬁ ve years earlier as revenge for the invasion of  Asia Minor by 
the  German crusaders.17 Having won the battle of  Mohács and taken  Buda, 
the capital city of the medieval Kingdom of  Hungary (1541), the Ottoman 
 troops occupied the middle parts of the country, some 120,000 square 
kilometres in all, and simultaneously made attempts to crush the  Habsburgs, 
who had secured for themselves the Hungarian royal crown. The failure of 
the  Ottomans and the ensuing stalemate between the two great powers led 
to a division of  Hungary. The western part was retained by the Hungarian 
Kingdom of the  Habsburgs, the middle was subjected to Ottoman  rule, and 
in the east the  Transylvanian Principality was born, governed by  Hungarians 
under Ottoman  overlordship. Consequently, the frontier between East and 
West now ran through the very heart of  Hungary, splitting the Hungarian 
people and the area in which they had settled in half in the form of two 
opposing systems of border fortresses. Ceaseless violence and the complete 
militarisation of life caused immeasurable damage to the basic structures 
of  Hungary. An important part of the infrastructure was destroyed, the 
medieval settlement structure was undermined, most of the former urban 
16 Sudár, B.: A végítélet könyve. Oszmán elbeszélő forrás a mohácsi csatáról [= The Book 
of Judgement. Ottoman narrative source about the battle of Mohács]. Történelmi Szemle 
52/3 (2010) 399, 403, 405, 410.  
17 Lewis, B.: The Muslim Discovery of Europe. New York–London 1982, 165.
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centres declined, the gravitational points of economic development shifted, 
and the whole process was topped by a real demographic catastrophe (with a 
loss in some regions of 70 to 90 per cent of the population). The Hungarian 
population suff ered dire losses and the ethnic groups that had hitherto lived 
on the marches of the medieval kingdom gained ground. The proportion of 
 Hungarians within multi-ethnic  Hungary sank from 75–80% to below 50% 
by the end of the period of Ottoman  rule. It is thus not without reason that 
some people detect in this period the roots of  Hungary’s post-World War I 
dismemberment. Similar damage was suff ered by the centres and institutions 
of the Hungarian cultural and religious network. Hundreds of noble courts 
and monasteries were destroyed, both in the territory of Ottoman  and 
Habsburg  Hungary, and the number of parishes decreased sharply as well.18 
Yet in the long run the greatest and almost incurable harm was caused by the 
fact that with the accession of the  Habsburgs the royal court was removed 
from  Hungary. This deprived the  Hungarians of the organisational centre 
that elsewhere in the West shaped the framework of the nation state in the 
early modern era by homogenizing territory, population and language, and 
by supporting culture. To give but one example, whereas in  France it was 
decreed as early as 1539 that  French, the language of the court, should 
be used in state administration as well, in  Hungary Hungarian became an 
offi  cial language only in 1844.19
The serious losses described above were clearly perceived by  Hungarians 
at the time, who, consequently, experienced the Ottoman  conquest from the 
outset as something that threatened them with the loss of their identity. From 
the ﬁ fteenth century on, all social factors in Hungary , from the king at the 
top to the peasants at the bottom, regarded the conquerors as savage, pagan, 
and natural enemies, the persecutors of the country and of the Christian 
faith, and later as archenemies or primal foes. The anti-Ottoman  struggle 
was conceived partly as self-defence, partly as a war that protected the entire 
Christian world (the West). Through the popes, Europe  recognised these 
eff orts by granting ﬁ rst to the king of Hungary and later to the whole 
country the title of “bulwark of Christianity”, although little eff ective 
18 Szakály, F.: Die Bilanz der Türkenherrschaft in Ungarn. AHistHung 34 (1988) 63–77; 
Rácz, I.: A török világ hagyatéka Magyarországon [= The legacy of the Turkish world in 
Hungary]. Debrecen 1995; Dávid, G.: Studies in the Demographic and Administrative 
History of Ottoman Hungary. Analecta Isisiana 25. Istanbul 1997, 1–88; Pálffy, G.: The 
Impact of the Ottoman Rule on Hungary. Hungarian Studies Review 28/1–2 (2001) 
109–32.
19 For the ﬁ rst phase of the Hungarian capital city’s transfer “abroad”, see Pálffy, G.: The 
Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century. Center for 
Hungarian Studies and Publications 18. Boulder/CO–Wayne, NJ 2009, 53–69.
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support went with the title to facilitate resistance. Hungarian historiography, 
secular and religious literature, art and folklore throughout the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries attest clearly to the fact that the  Hungarians clung 
to this role during the whole Ottoman  period, sometimes even attempting, 
somewhat paradoxically, to justify anti-Habsburg revolts and pro-Ottoman 
 political initiatives with the defence of Christianity.20 It is important to 
remark, however, that it was not only because of their religion that the 
Ottoman  Turks were rejected by the  Hungarians, but also on account of the 
“oriental” system of their state, society and customs, implying the lack of 
personal freedom and land ownership, both highly esteemed in Hungary .21
This explains why, despite long cohabitation and occasional political 
cooperation, Hungarian and Ottoman  Turkish cultures inﬂ uenced each other 
only superﬁ cially. The  Ottomans adopted almost nothing from Hungarian 
culture, and instead built up on Hungarian soil a high culture of their own, 
which became part of the present-day Hungarian cultural heritage. The 
most durable and conspicuous elements of this culture are the products of 
Turkish architecture: mosques, minarets, public baths, mausolea, schools, 
caravanserais, dervish lodges and well-houses. These are the northernmost 
relics of Islamic art from the early modern period, yet they failed to exert any 
inﬂ uence on Hungarian architecture (even Turkish bathing culture had only 
an indirect inﬂ uence). On the other hand,  Hungarians learned a lot from 
Turkish tanners, potters and armourers (boots, for instance, footwear of 
Turkish origin, became part of the Hungarian national costume), and a couple 
of Turkish vestments were also integrated into Hungarian dress. Turkish 
carpet weaving and ornamental art mainly enriched Hungarian embroidery 
and ornamentation with various motifs, and Turkish tiles from  Iznik and 
 Anatolian carpets were sometimes used in aristocratic and ecclesiastical circles. 
The most durable inﬂ uence can be detected in gastronomy and horticulture: 
it was via the  Turks that the  Hungarians became acquainted with coff ee, 
egg-barley, pie, stuff ed cabbage, apricot, maize, some species of pear and 
vine, and ﬂ owers. Some of the basic cooking utensils, such as the tepsi (oven 
pan) and the bogrács (cauldron), are also of Turkish origin.22 In the sphere 
of high culture poet Bálint  Balassi was an exceptional phenomenon. One of 
the founders of secular poetry in the Hungarian vernacular,  Balassi learned 
20 Imre, M.: “Magyarország panasza”. A Querela Hungariae toposz a XVI–XVII. század 
irodalmában [= The Querela Hungariae topos in the literature of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries]. Csokonai Könyvtár 5. Debrecen 1995, 160–62.
21 Rácz (n. 18) 53.
22 Rácz (n. 18) 67–82; Dávid, G.: Osmanlı Kültürünün Macaristanda’ki Yayılışı ve Etkisi. Bilig 
20 (Kış 2002) 89–100.
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Turkish, acquainted himself with Turkish mystical poetry and translated 
Turkish poems into Hungarian. Yet it is highly characteristic of the situation 
that it was also  Balassi who wrote the most beautiful and inﬂ uential poems 
about the heroic struggle of Hungarian soldiers against the  Ottomans, and 
he himself died ﬁ ghting against the conquerors.23 Nor did the Ottoman 
 presence involve any durable linguistic inﬂ uence, for Hungarian contains 
a mere handful of Turkish words that were borrowed during this period.24 
Here, on Hungarian soil, everything concurred to produce a rather closed 
cultural frontier between West and East.
While the  Turkish heritage in Hungarian culture is thin, there is a legacy 
of the Ottoman  period that is of crucial importance if one is to understand 
the Hungarian mentality. The Ottoman  conquest resulted not only in serious 
material and cultural losses to Hungary , it also caused a psychological break. 
It completely destroyed the self-conﬁ dence of the Hungarian political 
and cultural elites. The religious and political leaders of the period were 
virtually overwhelmed by a mixture of a sense of guilt and self-reproach. 
They proved unable to digest the fact that a country that had previously 
been “the star of Europe”25  had become the plaything of other states. Nor 
were they able to forgive themselves for having lost an “empire”. It was 
then that the mental reﬂ exes that are so familiar to the peoples of Central 
and Eastern Europe  began to emerge: the sense of loneliness ( Hungarians 
started complaining about this already in the ﬁ fteenth century!), the sense 
of the uniqueness of the tribulations suff ered, the turn towards the glorious 
past, the assumption of the role of the victim (we defend Europe but  receive 
nothing in exchange), extenuating the actions and, as a sort of recompense, 
adopting the sense of being chosen, which partly derived from Protestant 
apocalyptics. That the sense of inferiority also appeared at this time is 
evident from words written by eminent poet and army commander Miklós 
 Zrínyi in the middle of the seventeenth century: “We are not inferior to 
23 Sudár, B.: Egy Balassi-vers török háttere [= The Turkish background of a Balassi poem]. 
Keletkutatás 1995/ősz [1997] 67–79; Kőszeghy, P.: Balassi Bálint. Magyar Alkibiadész [= 
Bálint Balassi. The Hungarian Alcibiades]. Budapest 2008, 318–36.
24 Kakuk, S.: Recherches sur l’histoire de la langue osmanlie des XVIe et XVIIe siècles. Les éléments 
osmanlis de la langues hongroise. Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica XIX. Budapest 1973. 
25 These are the words of the soldier-poet Ferenc Wathay from 1604; see Wathay Ferenc 
énekeskönyve [= Ferenc Wathay’s songbook]. Eds. L. Nagy – Gy. Belia. Budapest 1976, 118 
(transcription), 92 (facsimile).
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any other nation.”26 While a heroic pathos prevailed (I quote  Zrínyi again: 
“here you either have to win or die”),27 action was paralysed by confusion, 
inconsistency, and internal strife. After the Ottoman  conquest divided the 
country, the conﬂ icts between the political leaders of the various parts often 
degenerated into civil wars. The renewal of the faith (Reformation) resulted 
in disastrous religious divisions within Hungary , and the various confessions 
blamed one another for the collapse of the country. And in the end, the 
Hungarian leaders sought refuge in an utter paradox: in order to escape the 
terrible daily consequences of the Ottoman  conquest, they made alliances 
with the Ottoman  state itself.28 Thus Ban  Péter  Zrínyi, who translated his 
brother Miklós’ epic entitled Szigeti veszedelem (The Peril of Sziget), the 
apotheosis of Hungarian military bravado, as well as his work entitled Adriai 
tengernek Syrenája (The Siren of the Adriatic Sea) into  Croatian and who 
must have known by heart his brother’s injunction against accepting the 
“Turkish opium” (that is Ottoman  alliance), and who, in the translations, 
condemned the demonised  Ottomans much more severely than had his 
brother, paid with his life for his intention to submit to the  Turks.29 And to 
cite another example, at the end of the seventeenth century, when half of 
Europe was  united in an alliance to liberate Hungary , the largest Hungarian 
contingent fought with the Ottoman army, and Hungary , the “bulwark of 
Christianity”, was consequently stigmatized by  European public opinion 
as an “enemy of Christianity”.30 It was then that internal divisions within 
Hungarian society, divisions characterized by a twentieth-century historian 
with a metaphor about the separation of an Eastern Hungarian temper from 
26 Zrínyi, M.: Ne bántsd a magyart. Az török áﬁ um ellen való orvosság, avagy az töröknek 
magyarral való békessége ellen való antidotum [= Do not maltreat the Hungarian. A 
remedy for the Turkish opium, or the antidote to the peace between the Turks and the 
Hungarians]. In Zrínyi Miklós hadtudományi munkái. Budapest 19762, 322.
27 Zrínyi (n. 26) 318.
28 Papp, S.: Movements of the Hungarian Estates and the Ottoman Empire at the Turn 
of the 17th and the 18th Centuries. Mediterrán Tanulmányok/Études sur la région 
méditerranéenne 11 (2002) 125–36; Papp, S.: Ottoman Accounts of the Hungarian 
Movements against the Habsburgs at the Turn of the 17th and the 18th Centuries. In 
Frontiers of Ottoman Studies II. Eds. C. Imber – K. Kiyotaki. London–New York 2005, 
37–48.
29 R. Várkonyi, Á.: A Wesselényi szervezkedés történetéhez [= On the history of the 
Wesselényi machinations]. In Tanulmányok Szakály Ferenc emlékére. Eds. P. Fodor – G. 
Pálffy – I. Gy. Tóth. Budapest 2002, 423–460; Blažević, Z. – Coha, S.: Zrínyi Péter, 
A hősteremtés irodalmi modelljei és stratégiái [= The literary models and strategies of hero 
making]. In A Zrínyiek a magyar és a horvát históriában. Eds. S. Bene – G. Hausner. 
Budapest 2007, 137–164, in particular 144. 
30 Köpeczi, B.: Staatsräson und christliche Solidarität: Die ungarischen Aufstände und Europa 
in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts. Budapest 1983.
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a Western Hungarian one (Catholic vs Protestant, pro-Habsburg [labanc] 
vs independentist or pro- Transylvanian [kuruc]), began to harden.31 Just 
as the Ottoman  military advance drove a wedge into the body of the 
country, so the miserable situation brought about by the conquest split the 
Hungarian soul in two and pushed the  Hungarians towards the East more 
than ever before.
This duality and ambiguity of the Hungarian attitude to the Ottoman 
 Turks also prevailed in the periods of the baroque and romanticism. In the era 
of nation-building (from the end of the eighteenth century on), the memory 
of the  Mongol invasion and the century-long struggle against the Porte 
were important elements of identity and, even more so, foundation stones 
of the emerging national consciousness. The two most inﬂ uential poems 
of the Reform Era (1825–48), Ferenc  Kölcsey’s Himnusz/Hymn (1823, 
the national anthem of Hungary , set to music by Ferenc  Erkel) and Mihály 
 Vörösmarty’s Szózat/Appeal (1836, a kind of second Hungarian anthem), 
are direct successors to seventeenth-century  Zrínyi’s works in themes and 
phraseology: they all refer to the Turkish “yoke”, ill fate, punishment and 
atonement, and all entreat  God for help. Like  Zrínyi, both  Kölcsey and 
 Vörösmarty confront the  Hungarians with the fateful injunction: “here you 
must live, here you must die” (to cite the concluding line from  Vörösmarty’s 
Appeal). At the same time, unlike in the western countries where effl  orescent 
Orientalism mainly aff ected the elites, the  Hungarians found the gradually 
opening East more and more familiar.32 The conviction that  Hungarians 
had not simply originated in the East but were indeed the “People of the 
East” par excellence spread rapidly. This was the title given by Count István 
 Széchenyi, the main representative of the  European spirit and the greatest 
modernizer of the country, to his famous book of 1841. In it he wrote, “All 
the  Hungarians must do is to represent their so-far latent, never exposed … 
speciﬁ cities hidden in their  Asian cradle.”33 The relationship with the  Huns 
and  Turkic peoples came to the fore, and one of the most intriguing personas 
of the age was that of the scholar (such as Alexander  Csoma de Kőrös and 
31  Szekfű, Gy.: A magyar állam életrajza. Történeti tanulmány [= A biography of the 
Hungarian state. A historical study]. Budapest 1988 (reprint, ﬁ rst edition 1918), 116.
32 Staud, G.: Az orientalizmus a magyar romantikában [= Orientalism in Hungarian 
Romanticism]. Budapest 19992, 25–26; Fülemile, Á.: Gondolatok az orientalizmusról 
Marastoni Jakab Görög nő című képe kapcsán [= Thoughts on orientalism in connection 
with the picture Greek Woman by Jakab Marastoni]. Művészettörténeti Értesítő 44/1–2 
(2005) 109–24.
33  Széchenyi, Count I.: A Kelet népe [= People of the East]. Fontes Historiae Hungaricae 
Aevi Recentioris. Gróf  Széchenyi István összes munkái, 5. Ed. Z. Ferenczi. Budapest 
1925, 220.
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others) in search of the original homeland of the nation. Parallel with this 
development, Hungarian (historical) science paid increasing attention to the 
 Ottoman  Empire and produced more and more reliable and unbiased works 
on it.34 One of the elements of the Ottoman  Turkish heritage, the tárogató 
(originally called the Turkish pipe, developed from the Turkish zurna) rose 
to the rank of national instrument, and in 1839 it was already used in a stage 
play as the symbol of the  Hungarians of eastern origins.35
In this atmosphere there came a slow change in the assessment of the 
Ottoman  Turks and their domination of Hungary. The opinions were also 
deeply inﬂ uenced by the great political events of the century: the suppression 
of the 1848–49 revolution and war of independence and the fact that many 
of the leading personalities and participants in the revolution found asylum 
in the  Ottoman Empire , as had Ferenc  Rákóczi, the leader of the 1703 
uprising. After the  Crimean War (1853–56), rapprochement began between 
the  Ottoman Empire and the Monarchy, ﬁ rst and foremost between Turkish 
and Hungarian intellectuals.36
34 For some works of the period that had a strong inﬂ uence on the Hungarian views of 
the Turks, see Decsy, S.: Osmanograﬁ a az az: A’ török birodalom’ Természeti, erköltsi, 
egy-házi, polgári, ’s hadi állapottyának, és a’ Magyar Királyok ellen viselt nevezetesebb 
hadakozásainak summás leirása. Második, és imitt amott meg-jobbittatott ki-adás. 1–3. Rész 
[= Osmanographia, or a description of the natural, moral, religious, civil and military state 
of the Turkish empire and the most important battles against the Hungarian kings. Second, 
corrected edition. Parts 1–3]. Vienna 1789; Fényes, E.: A török birodalom leirása, történeti, 
statistikai és geográphiai tekintetben… A török birodalom földabroszával [= A description of 
the Turkish empire from a historical, statistical, and geographical perspective.] Pest 1854; 
Lázár, Gy.: Az ozmán uralom története Europában I–II. [= The history of Ottoman rule in 
Europe]. Budapest 1877.
35 Sudár, B. – Csörsz Rumen, I.: “Trombita, rézdob, tárogató...” A török hadizene és 
Magyarország [= “Bugle, copper drum, Turkish pipes…” Turkish military music and 
Hungary]. Enying 1996, 95.
36 Cf. Csorba, Gy.: Az 1848–49-es törökországi magyar emigráció története [= The history 
of Hungarian emigration to Turkey in 1848–49]. Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 112/2 
(1999) 352–97; Hermann, R. – Joó, A. – Mészáros, K. – Seres, I.: Török menedékjogot 
kapott magyar emigránsok rövid életrajzi összefoglalója / Türkiye’de Kendilerine Sığınma 
Hakkı Tanınan Macar Mültecilerin Özyaşamlarından Özetler [= A brief biographical 
sketch of Hungarian émigrés who were given refugee status in Turkey]. Budapest 2010; 
Nazir, B.: Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler. Osmanlı’ya Sığınanlar. İstanbul 2006. For the 
outstanding role of Arminius Vámbéry in Hungarian–Ottoman-Turkish rapprochement, 
see Hazai, Gy.: Vámbéry Ármin életútja [= The Life of Ármin Vámbéry]. In Hazai, 
Gy.: Vámbéry inspirációk. Dunaszerdahely 2009, 342–48; Kushner, D.: The Rise of 
Turkish Nationalism 1876–1908. London 1977, 9–10, 44–45, 53; Bartholomä, R.: Vom 
Zentralasien nach Windsor Castle. Leben und Werk des Orientalisten Arminius Vámbéry 
(1832–1913). Arbeitsmaterialien zum Orient 17. Würzburg 2006, 10–13, 45–49.
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In the second half of the nineteenth century the stress on the oriental 
traits of the  Hungarians acquired an important role in nation-building 
strategies as well. Representatives of two rival conceptions were struggling 
for dominance in Hungary  at the time. One was a conception of the state-
nation that took into consideration the multi-ethnic composition of the 
country’s population and regarded all nationalities, not only  Hungarians, as 
constituents of the Hungarian nation. In other words, the stress was laid on 
citizenship in their deﬁ nition of nationhood. The other view regarded the 
nation as a cultural community with a common ethnic origin and identical 
language. The latter conception ascribed great signiﬁ cance to recently 
discovered peasant culture, alleging to recognize in it the imprint of ancient 
oriental culture.37 This was reinforced by a sense of aloneness that had 
strengthened since the Ottoman  conquest and a fear of the stronger western 
nations (including the  Austrians) and the increasingly aggressive pan-
 German and pan-Slav ideologies. Hungarian patriots who felt they lacked 
relatives in Europe  turned with great enthusiasm and curiosity towards the 
East, where they sought support and asylum and where they were intent 
on ﬁ nding the ancient forms of the Hungarian character and soul. This was 
behind the rising popularity of the so-called Turanian or pan-Turanian ideas, 
which began to gain ground around the turn of the twentieth century and 
which can be traced back to the famous orientalist Arminius  Vámbéry.38 
This idea inspired the hope that threatened and solitary nations might also 
ﬁ nd a group of peoples with whom they constituted a community, or – 
in more daring visions – they could create a large  Eurasian empire. The 
pan-Turanian or Turkist ideology was most popular in the  Ottoman Empire 
 where, alongside so-called Ottomanism (a state-nation conception similar to 
the Hungarian ideology and partly developed under its inﬂ uence) it was the 
offi  cial ideology of the ruling elite up to the end of World War I.39
All this added up to a strengthening of pro-Turkish views as of the 
last third of the nineteenth century in Hungary.  Contributory factors were 
the experiences of the oriental crisis (1875–78), the series of defeats of the 
37 Hofer, T.: Construction of the ‘Folk Cultural Heritage’ in  Hungary and Rival Versions of 
National Identity. Ethnologia Europaea 21/2 (1991) 145–70.
38 Farkas, I.: A magyar turanisták [= The Hungarian touranists]. PhD thesis. Budapest 
2002, 23–28 (this is one of the best treatment of the subject that has attracted a good deal 
of interest in  Turkey, too; see, for instance, Demirkan, T.: Macar Turancıları. İstanbul 
2000; Önen, N.: İki Turan. Macaristan ve Türkiye’de Turancılık. İstanbul 2005). See 
further, Szendrei, L.: Turanizmus. Máriabesnyő 2010. For a new summary of  Vámbéry’s 
role, see Bartholomä (n. 36) 86–90.
39 Karpat, K. H.: The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and 
Community in the Late  Ottoman State. Oxford 2001, 276–407.
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 Ottomans and the advance of the  Russians in the  Balkans, which triggered 
passionate shows of pro-Turkish and anti- Russian sentiments. The process 
culminated in the legation of the Hungarian students in  Constantinople in 
January 1877, on the eve of the  Russian-Turkish war, when they presented 
an ornamental sword to the commander-in-chief of the  Turkish army. The 
visit was demonstratively returned in the spring of 1877, when on behalf 
of Sultan Abdülhamid II a Turkish delegation brought back 35 medieval 
manuscripts that had once belonged to the famous library of King Matthias 
Corvinus until they had been taken to  Istanbul by the troops of  Süleyman 
in the early sixteenth century. At the same time, a team of private Turkish 
persons also arrived to establish friendly relations directly with members of 
Hungarian society. They toured the country and were received everywhere 
in the spirit of Turkish–Hungarian kinship and brotherhood, which was 
surprising and new to the Turkish side.40
This pro-Turkish leaning in Hungarian public discourse was also 
manifest in the great scientiﬁ c dispute of the late nineteenth century, the so-
called “Ugrian– Turkic war”. The goal of this linguistic polemic was to decide 
whether the Hungarian language was of  Finno-Ugrian or  Turkic origin. The 
basically scientiﬁ c question assumed contemporary political dimensions: 
support for the notion of the  Turkic language relation had an anti-Habsburg 
overtone, expressing dissatisfaction with Hungary’s constitutional role within 
the Habsburg Monarchy and the supremacy of  Vienna.41 Some historians 
hurried to support this national and eastern orientation, using scholarship 
to project contemporary exigencies onto earlier centuries. In their works 
they polished the sixteenth–seventeenth century into a romantic epic of 
chivalrous, brave and honest  Hungarians in conﬂ ict with the similarly valiant 
 Turks and the “oppressive”  Habsburgs. These historians often called the 
 Ottomans the promoters of Hungarian national sentiments.42
This growing penchant for the East elicited harsh criticism from those 
orientated towards the West, and the concepts of East and West again 
assumed symbolic signiﬁ cance in the dispute. In the wording of poet Endre 
40 Erődi, B.: Csok jasa! A török küldöttség látogatásának emlékkönyve / Çok Yaşa. Türk 
Heyetinin Ziyareti’nden Hatıra Kitabı [= Çok yaşa! The memorial album of the visit of the 
Turkish delegation]. Budapest 2001.
41 On the debate, see Vásáry, I.: Vámbéry és a magyar őstörténet [= Vámbéry and early 
Hungarian history]. In Vámbéry Ármin emlékezete. Keleti értekezések 2. Budapest 1986, 
19–25.
42 See Dávid, G. – Fodor, P.: Hungarian Studies in Ottoman History. In The Ottomans and 
the Balkans. A Discussion of Historiography. Eds. F. Adanir – S. Faroqhi. The Ottoman 
Empire and Its Heritage. Politics, Society and Economy 25. Leiden–Boston–Köln 2002, 
314–16.
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 Ady, writing in 1905, Hungary  was a “ferry-land”, tossed to and fro between 
the shores of East and West – heading East again with Turanism.43 The 
politicians and intellectuals advocating the state-nation concept supported 
the Habsburg kingdom and a western orientation. Historians loyal to the 
 Habsburgs adduced historical arguments against oriental romanticism. 
Gyula  Szekfű, for example, an intellectual whose inﬂ uence was felt 
throughout the period from the pre-World War One years to the aftermath 
of World War Two, regarded the struggles that Hungary  had faced in the 
ﬁ fteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries as part of a clash between 
“East and West”, between two civilizations that diverted the Hungarian 
nation and state from the “right track” of development. His ﬁ nal conclusion 
was: “Turkish rule was the greatest, perhaps the only disaster of Hungarian 
history”.44 This dual evaluation of the Ottoman  Turks and their domination 
of Hungary  was also reinforced by authors of ﬁ ction of the day. Generations 
of Hungarian readers were “taught” by the immensely popular adventure 
stories set in the Ottoman period by  Mór  Jókai, who presented a fairly 
unbiased picture of the Turkish people as early as the middle of nineteenth 
century. The historical novels (The hero of  Buda by Ferenc  Donászy and 
Eclipse of the Crescent Moon by Géza  Gárdonyi) that were published around 
the turn of the century, however, described the sixteenth and seventeenth-
century Ottoman  Turks as  the greatest enemies of the nation – a view that 
still prevails.45
This did not prevent the  Hungarians from showing sympathy for 
their Turkish contemporaries. At the end of 1910, the adherents of the 
Turanian concept founded the so-called Turanian Society, and their scientiﬁ c 
programme, the aim of which was to gain better knowledge of the East, 
included the intention of securing the  Hungarians a leading role “in science 
and economy within the Turanian family of peoples.”46 This sense of shared 
affi  nities grew even stronger when the two countries fought in World War 
43 Ady, E.: Ismeretlen Korvin-kódex margójára [= In the margins of an unknown Corvinus 
codex]. Figyelő October 1905, 15.
44 Szekfű, Gy.: Magyar történet. A tizenhetedik század [= Hungarian history. The seventeenth 
century]. Hóman, B. – Szekfű, Gy.: Magyar történet 5. Budapest s. a., 108. 
45 Nineteenth-century Hungarian historical painting had a similar eff ect, see Galavics, 
G.: A történeti téma [= The historical theme]. In Művészet Magyarországon 1780–1830. 
Kiállítás a MTA MKCS és a MNG rendezésében, Magyar Nemzeti Galéria, 1980. Budapest 
1980, 63–72; Szvoboda Dománszky, G.: Régi dicsőségünk. Magyar históriai képek a XIX. 
században [= Our departed glory. Hungarian historical pictures in the nineteenth century]. 
Budapest 2001. 
46 Ablonczy, B.: Teleki Pál [= Pál Teleki]. Budapest 2005, 92; Szendrei (n. 38) 16.
Maroth.indb   415 2013.09.13.   17:14:29
416 PÁL FODOR
I as allies47 and both suff ered a similar fate after the cataclysm, losing a 
considerable portion of their territories and population. This also contributed 
to the establishment of extensive economic and cultural cooperation between 
the Hungarian and Turkish states in the interwar period.48 The traumas that 
the two peoples had endured, the reorganization of the two countries (in 
 Turkey a rapid and merciless Europeanization) and the search for their place 
in the grip of Nazism and Bolshevism elicited very similar responses among 
members of Hungarian and Turkish society. The Hungarian government 
took up the old notion of the bulwark of Christianity once again, this time 
referring to the defence of Europe against Bolshevism (and soon, after World 
War Two, Hungary  became the western wall of the communist world). From 
time to time leading intellectuals asked and still ask: What is Hungarian? 
What is Turkish? Do we belong to East or West?49 Instead of citing further 
volumes of studies, let it suffi  ce to refer to the oeuvre of Nobel Prize winning 
Orhan Pamuk, the Turkish writer who stubbornly and indefatigably analyses 
this “ferry-land” mentality, this troubled identity manifest in the drift to and 
fro between two shores.50
*
In 1853, four years after the defeat of the revolution and war of independence 
against the  Habsburgs, author Mór  Jókai, of whom I made mention above, 
published his novel Török világ Magyarországon (The  Turks in Hungary), 
 a sequel to Erdély aranykora (The Golden Age of Transylvania), a novel 
47 For an emotional document of the alliance between “cross” and “crescent”, see Magyar–
török almanach a Vörös Félhold javára [= Hungarian–Turkish almanac to the advantage of 
the Red Crescent]. Ed. I. Mezey. Budapest 1915. 
48 Dávid, G.: Modernizáció magyar részvétellel [= Modernization with Hungarian 
participation]. Korunk 1996/6, 61–65.
49 Mi a magyar? [= What is Hungarian?] Ed. Gy. Szekfű. Budapest 1939; Mi a magyar? 
[= What is Hungarian?]. Eds. I. Romsics – M. Szegedy-Maszák. Budapest 2005; Güvenç, 
B.: Türk Kimliği Kültür Tarihinin Kaynakları. İstanbul 1993; Kafadar, C.: A Rome 
of One’s Own: Reﬂ ections on Cultural Geography and Identity in the Lands of Rum. In 
History and Ideology: Architectural Heritage of the ‘Lands of Rum’. Eds. S. Bozdoğan – G. 
Necipoğlu. Special Issue. Muqarnas 24 (2007) 7–25. – On the very similar dilettante 
kinship theories in the two countries ﬂ ourishing even today, see Doğan, I.: Dilettáns 
nyelv- és néprokonsági nézetek párhuzamai Törökországban és Magyarországon [= Parallels 
between dilettante views in Turkey and Hungary concerning linguistic and ethnic kinship]. 
In A nyelvrokonságról. Az török, sumer és egyéb áﬁ um ellen való orvosság. Eds. L. Honti – S. 
Csúcs – L. Keresztes. Segédkönyvek a nyelvészet tanulmányozásához 104. Second, 
enlarged edition. Budapest 2010, 80–86.
50 Pamuk, O.: Beyaz Kale. İstanbul 1985; Pamuk, O.: Kara Kitap. İstanbul 1990; Pamuk, 
O.: Benim Adım Kırmızı. İstanbul 1998; Pamuk, O.: Kar. İstanbul 2002; Pamuk, O.: 
İstanbul: Hatıralar ve Şehir. İstanbul 2003.
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published in 1851 that enjoyed tremendous popularity. Essentially the novel, 
which is set in the second half of the seventeenth century, examines how one 
can lead a life of integrity in a world in which individual and state sovereignty 
are drastically limited (traces of independence were preserved only in the 
small princedom of  Transylvania). In the preface to the novel  Jókai makes it 
clear that he is seeking answers to the dilemmas of his day: “I could perhaps 
have chosen a more lustrous moment of  Hungarian history…; but a nation 
is characterized not by its good fortunes, but rather by its misfortunes.”51 
One of the episodes of the book (which is based on a historical work by 
János  Bethlen of the seventeenth century52 and constitutes almost a self-
standing novel within the novel) recounts how at the time of the rule of 
Mihály  Apaﬁ  (1661–90), following the Battle of  Saint Gotthard (which 
for the  Turks was a signiﬁ cant defeat) and the Peace of  Vasvár (1664), the 
Ottoman empire  sought to arrest the prince of  Wallachia, who was made 
a scapegoat. He, however, ﬂ ed to  Poland, and his wife, who was soon to 
give birth, found refuge in Transylvania. The  Turks immediately demanded 
that she be turned over to them, at which a great debate broke out in the 
prince’s court as to whether to give acquiesce to this demand or not. The 
consort of the prince and the wives of the noblemen took up the refugee’s 
cause, and Miklós  Bethlen took their side as well. Trusting in the rest of 
Europe to  support him, he argued against turning the woman over to the 
 Turks: “…well do I know that fortunately Transylvania lies in Europe,  where 
the countries take care of one another, and it is in the interests of every 
prince of Europe that  an independent country remain between them and 
the Ottoman power,  even if it is as small as Transylvania.”53 In a long and 
inﬂ uential speech, however, councillor Mihály  Teleki tore this naïve view 
to shreds, showing that there is no such thing as cooperation founded on 
shared values, only interest, and anyone who does not recognize his own 
interests is doomed to fall. This speech, with which  Jókai gave voice to his 
own perception and to the sentiments of numerous Hungarian intellectuals 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who shared his views, is worth 
citing at length because it gives forceful expression to the idea according to 
which, if it is in the interests of the country, then one should pursue alliances 
even with the forces of the East: “– I must speak bitter things to your graces, 
my lords! I am compelled to awaken you from a pleasant dream to a very 
51 Jókai, M.: Török világ Magyarországon I. [= The Turks in Hungary]. Jókai Mór munkái. 
Gyűjteményes díszkiadás. Budapest 1995, 5. 
52 Bethlen, J.: Erdély története 1629–1673 [= The history of Transylvania, 1629–1673]. 
Transl. J. P. Vásárhelyi. Ed. J. Jankovics. Budapest 1993, 245–48.
53 Jókai (n. 51) 181. 
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harsh reality. That we survive is Europe’s  most triﬂ ing care; we only have 
allies when our allies need sacriﬁ ces; if we plead, then no one knows us… 
It is true that once I said quite the opposite, but time is such a ﬁ ne master 
that sometimes in a single day it teaches one more than he learned in nine 
schools. As a consequence of the Battle of  Saint Gotthard a peace has been 
reached between the two emperors, I have read its conditions, there was not 
a single provision regarding us, the  Hungarians, not a single comma, we are 
forgotten, left out of the whole thing like a nation that needn’t be taken into 
consideration. Though the  French envoy was there, the  English envoy, the 
Polish envoy, and I could add, not one member of our court is paid as much 
as they were paid by us. If we are needed for war, oh, then we are a great 
and honourable nation, when the peace is concluded, they do not know we 
exist. In the battle we can be at the forefront, when the spoils are divided 
we needn’t come. … – Oh gentleman, let us confess amongst ourselves that 
we play the role of lord in this land, but in truth we are no longer its lords. 
To trust in our strength, the rely on the justice of our cause will no longer 
help us, we have no patrons, neither to the left nor to the right, only rulers: 
whichever one we may turn to, we merely change rulers, we do not make 
an alliance. It is good to whisper this secret to ourselves, but even better to 
guard it, so that no one else may know, and if our rule is mere semblance, this 
semblance is worth a great deal to us, and we should take care not to cause 
it to wane. The power that looms above us is simply waiting for a reason to 
put its plan into eff ect, and no one in  Transylvania would do greater service 
to this power than the man who would be the ﬁ rst to lift his gaze against 
it… We have one duty: know what little we have and be sure to keep it, and 
if the time should come, we can annex new possessions to it. We have no 
friends, and we should be friends to no one. If we bow before compulsion, 
will the world scorn us? And if we break ourselves standing up against a 
greater power will it not also scorn us? The world asks magnanimity of us; 
was it ever magnanimous to us, was it even simply just? Yes, while the sword 
was in our hand we used it to defend all of Europe, but  this sword has been 
broken, our country rent asunder; the pagans trampled us down for all the 
peoples to see, we bled for a century-and-a-half, and no one came to our aid, 
the gates to our country are guarded by our enemies, and like the scorpion 
surrounded by a ring of ﬁ re, we can only turn our bitterness on ourselves! 
Are we to blame for the fact that we no longer can defend the exile who has 
sought refuge among us? Fate and the world have ﬁ nished reckoning with 
us; the country no longer owes anything to anyone, only to itself. So, things 
being as they are, if we do not deliver the  Wallachian princess to  Olay Bey for 
whatever reason, even if it is merely to wait for the return of the envoys we 
have sent to ask for mercy, he has orders to summon the armies of the Pasha 
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of  Buda and the Pasha of  Várad into the country to make it an attendant 
domain of the Porte; here all compassion, all human regard wanes, only one 
duty remains: self-preservation, and this orders us, whatsoever we cannot 
change, to do willingly…”54
In Hungary and the European Union today some people have observed 
the turn in contemporary Hungarian foreign policy towards the “east,” the 
occasionally quite visible turn away from western allies and their expectations, 
with some baffl  ement. The new “oriental” romanticism that has emerged in 
some circles of Hungarian society has caused similar surprise and garnered 
similar international attention, for instance the “Neo-Turanism”, which has 
been associated by many (probably incorrectly) with right-wing political forces 
only.55 However, given the situation in which Hungary has  found itself for 
over one-thousand years, on the border of East and West, not to mention the 
reﬂ exes that evolved as a consequence of the period of Ottoman occupation , 
it would perhaps be even more surprising if this orientation towards the east 
were not to rise to the surface from time to time, if the Turkish legacy, albeit 
an ambiguous one fraught with contradiction, were not to be felt at all in 
Hungary  today. The lines cited from  Jókai’s novel perhaps off er a better 
explanation for the endurance of this attachment to the East more elegantly 
and profoundly than would any longwinded historical explanation.
54 Jókai (n. 51) 181–83.
55 Akçali, E. – Korkut, U.: Geographical Metanarratives in East-Central Europe: Neo-
Turanism in Hungary. Eurasian Geography and Economics 53/5 (2012) 596–614.
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